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83-1700/4

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

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
June 30, 1983

The Honorable William Casey
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

Enclosed are additional questions of Senators Inouye, Durenberger, Huddleston, and Leahy regarding S. 1324.

Sincerely,



Barry Goldwater

Chairman

DCI
 EXEC
 REG

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COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW



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NATIONAL MEDIA MONITOR • PRESS/RADIO/TV

Hostage
families
under
siege




White House beat:
What price glory?



Blue-collar blues at the *Daily News*



Hoodwinking
the press



SABOTAGING THE DISSIDENT PRESS

The untold story of the secret offensive waged by the U.S. government against antiwar publications

by ANGUS MACKENZIE

The American public has learned in the last few years a great deal about the government's surveillance of the left during the Vietnam War era. The report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church committee) first suggested how widely the government had been involved in planting informants inside New Left groups, propagating false information about these groups, and using a variety of tactics to disrupt their activities. That such tactics were also used on a vast scale against dissenting magazines and the underground press, however, has not been reported in a comprehensive way. The story has lain scattered in a hundred places. Now, documents obtained by editors and writers under the Freedom of Information Act, and interviews with former intelligence agents, make it possible, for the first time, to put together a coherent — though not necessarily complete — account of the federal government's systematic and sustained violation of the First Amendment during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The government's offensive against the underground press primarily involved three agencies — the CIA, the FBI, and the Army. In many cases, their

activities stemmed from what they could claim were legitimate concerns. The CIA's Operation CHAOS, for example, was set up to look into the foreign connections of domestic dissidents; however, it soon exceeded its mandate and became part of the broad attack on the left and on publications that were regarded as creating a climate disruptive of the war effort. At its height, the government's offensive may have affected more than 150 of the roughly 500 underground publications that became the nerve centers of the antiwar and countercultural movements.

A telling example of this offensive was the harassment of Liberation News Service, which, when opposition to the Vietnam War was building, played a key role in keeping the disparate parts of the antiwar movement informed. By 1968, the FBI had assigned three informants to penetrate the news service, while nine other informants regularly reported on it from the outside. Their reports were forwarded to the U.S. Army's Counterintelligence Branch, where an analyst kept tabs on LNS founders Ray Mungo and Marshall Bloom, and to the Secret Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the Navy, the Air Force, and the CIA. The FBI also attempted to discredit and break up the news service through various counterintelligence activities, such as trying to make LNS appear to be an FBI front, to create friction among staff members, and to burn down the LNS office in Washington while the staff slept upstairs. Before long, the CIA, too, joined the offensive; one of its recruits began filing reports on the movements of LNS staff members while reporting for the underground press to establish his cover as an underground journalist.

The CIA was apparently the first federal agency to plan actions against domestic publications. Its Operation CHAOS grew out of an investigation of *Ramparts* magazine, which during the

late 1960s was perhaps the leading national publication of the left. In early 1967, *Ramparts* was preparing to publish an exposé on the CIA's funding of the U.S. National Student Association and on various foundations the agency used as conduits for that funding. The CIA got wind of the article in January 1967, two months before the planned March publication date. Viewing the article as "an attack on CIA in particular and the administration in general," the agency started to monitor the activities of *Ramparts* editors, ostensibly to ascertain whether they had contacts with hostile intelligence services. The CIA's Directorate of Plans (its "dirty tricks" department) assigned to counterintelligence agent Richard Ober the task of "pulling together information on *Ramparts*, including any evidence of subversion [and] devising proposals for counteraction." While those proposals remain secret, several details relating to the *Ramparts* operation have become known.

In February 1, an associate of Ober's met with Thomas Terry, assistant to the commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, to request that the IRS review *Ramparts*' corporate tax returns to determine who the magazine's backers were. Terry agreed to do so. Subsequently, Ober's office provided the IRS with "detailed informant information" about *Ramparts* backers, whom the IRS was requested to investigate for possible tax violations. Ober's investigation of the magazine uncovered no "evidence of subversion" or ties to foreign intelligence agencies. By August, however, it had produced a computerized listing of several hundred Americans, about fifty of whom were the subject of detailed files.

In August, too, Ober's mandate was expanded as the CIA, responding to pressure from President Johnson, ini-

Angus Mackenzie is a free-lance writer in northern California. Editorial assistance was provided by Jay Peterzell of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington, which also provided research assistance. The article was financed in part by the Fund for Investigative Journalism.

tiated a massive and largely still-secret program of spying on and analyzing political protest — that is, Operation CHAOS. The underground press was one of its targets, the others being antiwar groups, radical youth organizations, black militants, and deserters and draft resisters. CHAOS, of course, raised special problems because it violated a clause in the agency's charter prohibiting the CIA from performing any "internal security function." To give a semblance of legality to the operation, the same justification was used as in the *Ramparts* investigation — namely, that the motive was to search out possible foreign funding or control.

In tracking the press, the CIA was able to count on help from the Army, with which, CHAOS files state, "Direct operational discussions on joint agent operations have been held." Ralph Stein directed the "New Left" desk for the Army's Counterintelligence Analysis Branch in Arlington, Virginia. The branch kept track of underground periodicals and maintained a microfilm crossfile on writers and editors affiliated with them. Stein got most of his information from public sources, but some of it came from classified intelligence reports which, he says, were provided by FBI and Army infiltrators. "Their information was too good, too inside," to have come from public source material, Stein recalled in a recent interview.

In late 1967, Stein was dispatched to CIA headquarters to brief liaison officer Jim Ludlum and others (presumably from Ober's office) on underground and student publications. He found, however, that the CIA men already knew a great deal about the subject. Two questions were foremost in their minds. They wanted to know all about "the ideas and beliefs of the individuals who produced these publications," Stein recalled, and about foreign financing of such prominent publications as *Ramparts* and a host of small underground papers. Stein's response to the latter question was, presumably, unsatisfactory. "Far from being financed by any hostile power abroad," he commented recently, "the people who were putting out these papers were actually using their lunch money, and we were able to prove this." After his briefing session at the CIA, Stein returned to his Arlington

office, where he remarked that he thought the CIA was not supposed to engage in domestic surveillance. Shortly thereafter, he was relieved of his liaison duties with the agency, which were taken over by a superior.

Like Stein, Ober found no evidence to support the suspicion that domestic dissidents were being financed or controlled by foreign powers. And, to Ober's credit, his office consistently reported that the antiwar and black nationalist movements were, in fact, re-

sponds to domestic political and economic frustrations. But the White House could not abandon what had by now become an *idée fixe* and — particularly after Richard Nixon's election in 1968 — it pushed the CIA to probe further into domestic politics. The collection of names continued apace. (By 1973, when CHAOS was converted into the CIA's International Terrorism Group, the computerized list of Americans that Ober had begun to compile in 1967 had grown to include 300,000 names.)

In May 1969, as surveillance activities increased, then-CIA director

Like many small antiwar papers, the Buffalo Town Crier was printed by a non-union shop. No sooner had its first issue hit the street in Buffalo, New York, than the FBI, not otherwise known as a friend of organized labor, laid plans to put the paper out of business by denouncing it anonymously to union leaders

SAC, Buffalo (100-19652)

1/29/69

100-449698-6-13
Director, FBI (100-449698) *710*

REC-121
COINTELPRO - NEW LEFT

Reurlet 1/16/69.

The suggestion set forth in relet that you anonymously notify the local trade union leaders in the Buffalo area of the fact that the "Buffalo Town Crier" is being printed without union labor has merit and should be pursued further. Your letter states, however, that you plan to furnish this information anonymously to trade union leaders, especially those connected with the printing industry. It is felt that the organization most interested in this would be the printing unions and, therefore, your anonymous communication should be restricted to them. In this regard, you should furnish a copy of the paper to these unions with your anonymous letter.

Assure that all steps necessary are taken to protect the Bureau as the source of these communications.


Advise of any results obtained.

RJH:jes

(4)

NOTE:

By relet, BU advised that a New Left publication, "Buffalo Town Crier," was being printed without the use of union labor. BU suggested that it might be possible to force this publication out of business by anonymously notifying trade union leaders of the fact that it was published without union labor. BU suggested that if the unions forced the newspaper to hire by union scale, the increased costs would prohibit its publication.



Richard Helms stated in a memo to field offices that "Operational priority of CHAOS activities in the field is in the highest category, ranking with Soviet and Chicom [Chinese Communist]." While the agency had formerly relied on FBI personnel, it now began recruiting outsiders for CHAOS undercover work. One such recruit was Sal Ferrera, mentioned in a December 27, 1977, *New York Times* article as having worked as a CIA operative in Washington, D.C., and Paris. The details of Ferrera's association with Operation CHAOS are reported here for the first time. They provide a glimpse into just how the CIA spied on the American press.

Ferrera grew up in Chicago, studied revolutionary theory at Loyola University, and in 1969 moved to Washington, D.C., where he made contact with local journalists writing for underground publications. He attended early meetings of the newly founded *Quicksilver Times*, which quickly became the city's leading crusader against the Vietnam War. When the first issue came out on June 16, 1969, Ferrera's name was on the masthead. He participated in editorial decisions and represented the paper at various functions, and he continued to work in the underground press at home and abroad until 1974.

At some point not yet known he also went to work for CHAOS, his underground press connections providing him with impeccable "radical credentials." Wherever there was radical activity, Ferrera seemed to be there. Between January and April 1970, he interviewed Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and other members of the Chicago Seven, as well as their lawyer, William Kunstler. In Washington, he became acquainted with Karl Hess, who worked for *The Libertarian* magazine, and soon took to dropping in to visit Hess's office in the basement of the Institute for Policy Studies, a center for antiwar activities.

During the 1971 May Day antiwar demonstration in Washington, Ferrera took photographs and reported on the event for College Press Service, an antiwar syndication service; he may well have been the agent mentioned in the Rockefeller Commission's hearings on the CIA as having covered the demonstration for the agency. He also appears to have been the source of two reports to

the CIA regarding staff members of Liberation News Service. In late April, when Ferrera was still working in the *Quicksilver* office, an LNS editor stopped in to ask if LNS staff members who planned to come down from New York for May Day could lodge there. A CHAOS informant's report, dated April 25 and released to LNS editor Andrew Marx under the FOIA, refers to this visit. A second report lists all LNS staff members who attended the May Day demonstration.

Ferrera subsequently went to live in Paris, where he wrote articles on radical student politics for LNS and College Press Service. In 1972, the CIA assigned Ferrera and another agent to monitor the activities of Philip Agee, who was then living in Paris and writing *Inside the Company*, his exposé of CIA operations in Latin America. Ferrera returned to the U.S. (and legally changed his name) in 1975, the year Agee's book appeared. When interviewed for this article, he denied his relationship with the CIA.

Ferrera's activities were not unique, as documents obtained by the Center for National Security Studies, a public-interest group based in Washington, D.C., make clear. In one memorandum a former CIA case officer for domestic CHAOS agents is quoted as saying that several such agents were active in this country "anywhere from months to years." Their activities belie the contention of the Church committee report, based on the claims of the CIA itself, that CHAOS agents operated in the U.S. primarily for training and cover purposes.

Four months after CHAOS was set up, the CIA initiated another domestic spying program. Run by the agency's Office of Security, it was dubbed Project Resistance — and it soon came up with a novel and quite effective means of shutting down dissident publications. Created in the wake of a program begun in February 1967 and designed narrowly to protect CIA recruiters on college campuses, Resistance soon became a nationwide probe of campus and non-campus dissident groups, paying special attention to the underground press. The Church committee report stated that

Project Resistance was "a broad effort to obtain general background for predicting violence, which might have created threats to CIA installations, recruiters or contractors. . . ." Files obtained by the Center for National Security Studies, however, make it clear that Project Resistance's main purpose was to infiltrate the underground press, and that it did so routinely, sometimes through local police informers.

In late 1968, a Resistance analyst filed the following memo:

A modern phenomenon which has evolved in the last three or four years is the vast growth of the Underground Press. Underground means of mass communication utilized to avoid suppression by legal authority and/or attribution is not new to this age, but its volume is and the apparent freedom and ease in which filth, slanderous and libelous statements, and what appear to be almost treasonous anti-establishment propaganda is allowed to circulate is difficult to rationalize.

Then he suggested a novel strategy for silencing such "anti-establishment propaganda." The underground papers, he wrote, "are not a quality press. Eight out of 10 would fail if a few phonograph record companies stopped advertising in them." Since Resistance, like CHAOS, was nominally a spy operation, and since, again nominally, the CIA was prohibited from performing any "internal security function," the CIA did not itself feel comfortable carrying out such a program. The FBI, however, felt no such inhibitions.

In January 1969, four months after the Resistance agent had filed his memo on the underground press, the FBI's San Francisco office wrote to headquarters in Washington and to the FBI's New York office, asserting that financial "assistance" from Columbia Records — i.e., advertisements in the *Berkeley Barb* and other underground papers — "appears to be giving active aid and comfort to enemies of the United States." The San Francisco office suggested that the FBI should use its contacts to persuade Columbia Records to stop advertising in the underground press.

One of the first publications to feel the effect of this strategy was the *Free Press*, an alternative paper in Washington, D.C. Its February 1 issue was the last to carry Columbia record ads, a vital source of revenue. By the end of the

year the paper was dead. In Wisconsin, the six-paper Kaleidoscope underground chain, created for the express purpose of obtaining ads from New York record companies, also succumbed. In a recent interview, Marc Knops, the editor of the *Madison Kaleidoscope*, which survived briefly on local ads, said that when the record companies pulled out, "The bottom fell out of the ad market. By autumn 1969 there was no income. Kaleidoscope was gone as a functioning chain." (In 1970 the former chain's Milwaukee paper, also surviving on local ads, was

the target of another effort by the FBI's local office, which attempted — but failed — to use "public exposure" to gain the dismissal of two professors who frequently contributed to the underground paper. Similar, more successful efforts were directed against professors at the University of South Alabama who had contributed to the radical *Rearguard*.)

Deprived of most of its record ads, the *Berkeley Barb* survived on lewd sex ads. At the *Barb*, as elsewhere, editors and staff had no clear indication of why

a major source of revenue had suddenly evaporated. Columbia Records has declined to comment.

Throughout the country, other FBI offices employed similar tactics to silence the dissident press. When headquarters ordered the Detroit office to "neutralize" the *South End* and the *State News*, the student papers at Wayne State and Michigan State universities respectively, the office sent anonymous letters of protest to local businesses that advertised in them. A more limited campaign was waged against *The Tech*, the student paper at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Another bureau ploy used against college papers consisted of anonymously mailing their most controversial articles to funding sources and other influential persons, including state legislators, college trustees, and "friendly news media." "Items submitted should be extremely radical on their face, use profanity or be repulsive in nature," J. Edgar Hoover stated in a directive to fourteen field offices in May 1968.

The FBI also enlisted the assistance of local banks. In Cincinnati, the branch office obtained transaction records for two underground papers, the *Independent Eye* and the *Queen City Express*, helping it to identify advertisers and contributors. "As information is gathered," a memo dated July 8, 1970 stated, "it is believed there will be opportunities to suggest counterintelligence action against individuals and groups who are giving financial support to these publications."

Showing initiative, in 1970 the El Paso office proposed a "possible counterintelligent [sic] action" designed to silence the editor of the underground *The Sea Turtle and the Shark*; the idea was to publicize his alleged past criminal activities and "dependence upon various welfare programs." Eventually the editor was arrested for selling an "obscene newspaper" to a minor after the FBI had supplied information to local authorities.

In addition to these comparatively restrained strategies, the FBI also instigated violent acts. In San Diego, for instance, the paramilitary Secret Army Organization, led by FBI informant

In this 1968 letter, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover authorized the Bureau's Detroit office to go after South End, the student paper at Wayne State University. The plan: send anonymous letters — e.g., from "a concerned parent" — urging state officials to cut off the paper's funding. He also suggested leaning on South End's advertisers

SAC, Detroit (157-3214)
Director, FBI REC 126 (100-440006) 251
1 - Mr. C. D. [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

11/19/68

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Reurlet 10/29/68.

Authority is granted to mail the anonymous letters set out in relet. Take the usual precautions to insure this mailing cannot be traced to the Bureau. Advise the Bureau of any results.

As a further technique in this matter Detroit should submit a recommendation to alert appropriate advertisers in the "South End" to the extremist nature of this newspaper.

TJD:lan
(G)

NOTE:

The [redacted] is the student newspaper at Wayne State University. It is supported by school funds and this is a state-supported university. This newspaper has a black extremist viewpoint and is self-described as "revolutionary." It is sympathetic to the Black Panther Party, and carries as its slogan: "The year of the heroic guerrilla." We previously alerted a publication to the nature of this newspaper. Now a Detroit newspaper has published an expose of the "South End" and it is appropriate to send the anonymous letters being approved. These are supposedly from a concerned parent and a concerned student and will be directed to state and university authorities responsible for funding this newspaper, including Governor Romney of Michigan.

A letter is also being sent to the Archbishop of Detroit concerning a Catholic group funding W.E.B. Du Bois Institute of Black Studies. This letter points out the Communist nature of the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America and the revolutionary nature of this institute. Since these letters are anonymous there is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau and they may help cut off funds being used for black extremist propaganda.

27-190087 TELETYPE UNIT

Howard Godfrey, assaulted the offices and staff of the *Street Journal* on December 25, 1969. By January of 1971, the commune that published the *Journal* had broken up. FBI documents released under the FOIA show for the first time that the Secret Army Organization's operations extended as far east as Wisconsin, where the organization threatened to kidnap Mike Fellner, editor of the radical Madison paper *Takeover*.

In some cities, when direct attacks proved unsuccessful, the government set up its own phony news service which, so long as it was unexposed, provided a means of penetrating the left; once exposed, it cast suspicion on legitimate underground reporters and helped to create a feeling of paranoia. The Army started *Midwest News* in Chicago, according to former intelligence officer

Ralph Stein; in San Francisco, the FBI set up Pacific International News Service. The head of the FBI's San Francisco office at the time, Charles Bates — he is now a reporter for KGO-TV in San Francisco — said recently that he did not specifically recall Pacific International, but added that front operations of that kind "would have been fine if it weren't put down in writing." A spokesman for the San Francisco field office refused to confirm or deny the bureau's use of the news service. Meanwhile, on the East Coast, the FBI operated New York Press Service under the direction of Louis Salzberg. NYPS offered its services to left-wing publications at attractive rates, soliciting business with a letter that read, in part: "The next time your organization schedules a demonstration, march, picket or office party, let us know in advance. We'll

cover it like a blanket and deliver a cost free sample of our work to your office." NYPS's cover was blown when Salzberg surfaced as a government witness in the Chicago Seven trial, during which it was disclosed that he had been an FBI informant.

The New York field office shrewdly turned this setback into a means of casting suspicion on Liberation News Service. The office prepared an anonymous letter, copies of which were sent to newspapers and antiwar groups, accusing LNS of being an FBI front. "Lns [sic] is in an ideal position to infiltrate the movement at every level," the letter stated. "It has carefully concealed its books from all but a select few. Former employees have openly questioned its sources of operating funds. I shall write to you further on Lns for I (and several others) are taking steps to expose this fraud for what it really is — a government financed front."

Fiefdoms of information

In my two-year-long effort to obtain federal agency files on underground publications, I learned almost as much about how the Freedom of Information Act works — or doesn't work — as I did about the means by which the government sought to suppress dissent in the 1960s and 1970s. I found, above all, that while some agencies were quite cooperative, the CIA and FBI proved adept at keeping their information to themselves.

In requesting FBI counterintelligence files and the entire "New Left Publications" file under the FOIA, I was able to supply the bureau with seventy-eight file numbers relating to forty-seven periodicals (obtained from heavily censored files previously released to editors of publications that no longer exist). Since the most difficult element in any request is identifying documents specifically enough so that the agency can locate them, this should have facilitated a quick response. Instead, the FBI demanded an advance deposit of \$1,100 for more than 1,100 hours of search time. My appeal of that payment is still pending.

In the case of the CIA, I was able to supply the agency with four file numbers. After twenty-six days a letter came stating that I would have to agree to unspecified search fees. Nothing then happened until

fourteen months later, when a second letter said I would have to deposit \$30,000 on a search they estimated would cost a total of \$61,501.

The Secret Service, by contrast, waived search-and-copy fees and complied with my request within seventeen days, sending forty censored pages dealing with nineteen newspapers — even though I had been unable to supply any file numbers to the service. Likewise, the Department of Defense attempted to comply with the intent of the act, although, again, I was unable to supply file numbers. Within thirty-two days of my request, the department waived \$445.50 in search-and-copy fees. After a search, its Defense Investigative Service determined that it might have records on seventeen of the 500 newspapers on my list.

Supposedly, new teeth were put in the FOIA in 1974. At the time, a House-Senate conference report said that agencies must comply with requests within thirty days, that "fees should not be used for the purpose of discouraging requests," and that withheld files must concern activity within the agency's legal authority. My experience shows that the CIA and the FBI refuse to comply with both the intent and letter of the amended act.

A.M.

Such, then, were the techniques used by the U.S. government to stifle freedom of expression in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These and other violations of American civil liberties, as publicized in the Church committee report, together with the public revulsion that attended its publication, resulted in restrictions on domestic surveillance by the CIA and FBI. Now the removal of those safeguards seems a distinct possibility, at least to judge by the recent report on intelligence issued by the Heritage Foundation and embraced by the Reagan transition team. That report claims that "The threat to the internal security of the Republic is greater today than at any time since World War II" and recommends resurrecting the standing internal security committees in Congress and, once again, permitting the FBI and CIA to spy on dissidents, including journalists.

If Reagan officials do go ahead and propose such measures, they will undoubtedly argue that guarantees can be established to prevent surveillance from getting out of hand. But if the experience of the Johnson and Nixon years is any guide, even programs which begin quite modestly can expand far beyond their original mandate.

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C. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C-1. COLBY REPORT; December 24, 1974; 64 pages. A letter from Colby to the President regarding a December 22, 1974 *New York Times* article revealing CIA domestic intelligence activities. Nine annexes are attached to the letter, which include discussions of the Huston Plan, interagency programs, a counterintelligence office, Schlesinger's request asking employees to report non-chartered CIA activities [may be ordered as C-5(e)], and a March 5, 1974 memo terminating Operation CHAOS. (\$6.40/copy)

C-5. This series of documents (through C-5e) were referred to in a report on CIA domestic activities presented by Director Colby to the Senate Appropriations Committee on January 15, 1975:

C-5(a). ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS, DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION AND STATION (DODS); February 11, 1963; 1 page. The mission of the DODS is described as directing, supporting and coordinating "clandestine operational activities . . . within the United States against foreign targets" (\$10/copy)

C-5(b). REDesignATION OF A COMPONENT; January 28, 1972; 1 page. An intra-agency memo from Thomas Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans, announcing the change in the name of the Domestic Operations Division (DO) to Foreign Resources Division (FR). (\$10/copy)

C-5(c). CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DAVID GINSBURG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, AND RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR OF THE CIA; August 29, 1967 and September 1, 1967; 3 pages. Contains a request by Ginsburg for information on any civil disorder intelligence the CIA may have, and Helms' reply. (\$30/copy)

C-5(d). RESTLESS YOUTH; September 1968, No. 0613/68; 41 pages. The report analyzes the international youth movement of the late 1960s, studies its sociological base, and attempts to understand its structure, purposes, goals, and possible ramifications. The report cites the Civil Rights Movement of the early 1960s as proving to dissidents later in the decade that confrontational politics is the only means of accomplishing political change. See also C-12(b) (\$4.10/copy)

C-5(e). MEMORANDUM FOR ALL CIA EMPLOYEES FROM JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, DIRECTOR; May 9, 1973; 2 pages. The Director requests that all CIA personnel report to him any past or present activities which lie outside the Agency's charter, and directs that if an order is given to a CIA employee which is inconsistent with the

Agency's charter, the employee should report the incident to the Director. See also C-1. (\$20/copy)

C-6. DELIMITATION AGREEMENT OF 1948; September and October 1948; 7 pages. The documents constitute an agreement between the FBI and the CIA permitting CIA contacts with émigré groups and individuals in the United States. (\$70/copy)

C-8. "POTENTIAL FLAP ACTIVITIES." MEMO TO WILLIAM COLBY FROM WILLIAM V. BROE, INSPECTOR GENERAL; May 21, 1973; 26 pages. The first portion of the Memo discusses CIA contacts with Watergate figures, and CIA participation in the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff, established to evaluate domestic intelligence studies. The second portion of the Memo covers Support, Real Estate, Procurement, Cover, Activities Directed Against U.S. Citizens, and Collection Activities. (\$2.60/copy)

C-10. FORMAL MEMORANDUM ON RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FBI AND CIA IN THE UNITED STATES; February 7, 1966; 2 pages. This memo referred to on page 57 of the Rockefeller Commission Report. The memo contains no information not included in that Report. (\$20/copy)

C-11. DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN "COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 1963-1973"; September 1970 and undated; 11 pages. This file contains three CIA documents released to CNSS through the FOIA litigation and describing events in Chile during September 1970. The reports concern alleged attempts by the Chilean Communist Party to take-over media outlets, splits within the Christian Democratic Party, the growth of "Patria y Libertad," and Allende's character and career. (\$1.10)

C-12(a). FAMILY JEWELS—ACTIVITIES CONSTRUED TO BE OUTSIDE THE CIA CHARTER; May 1970 - May 1973; 65 pages. DCI James Schlesinger's directive of May 9, 1973 [see C-5(e)] requested CIA employees to report activities which could be considered outside the charter of the Agency. The request released this partial file of questionable activities, including domestic surveillance operations, arrangements with American firms, assistance to local police departments, and Office of Security support to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. (\$6.50/copy)

***C-12(b). RESTLESS YOUTH**; 1968; 245 pages. A version of the CIA's 1968 study of worldwide student dissidence which includes a 199-page section reporting on student movements in 19 foreign countries. Part I is identical to C-5(d) except that it includes some photographs and one paragraph deleted from that version. (\$24.50/copy)

***C-12(c). "FAMILY JEWELS" MEMORANDA**; 1968 and 1973; 18 pages. Memoranda to the DCI from various offices responding to his request that CIA activities which may be outside the Agency's charter be reported. The memoranda show that the Agency examined satellite photographs in analyzing domestic civil disturbances, that the Domestic Contact Service collects information on foreign students studying in the U.S., and that in 1969 and 1970 several studies were prepared on black radical movements in the Caribbean, one of which focused on possible links to the U.S. black power movement. (\$1.80/copy)

***C-13/15. CIA/DOCUMENTS ON PROJECTS RESISTANCE AND MERRIMAC**; 1966-1975; 1987 pages. Documents in this file, released to CNSS through the FOIA, contain a number of discrepancies from, or additions to, the account of the projects in the Rockefeller and Church Reports. These relate to the use of informants in Resistance; the scope of Resistance; the use of Army counterintelligence information in Resistance reports; a proposed expansion of Merrimac in 1968; and Merrimac operations outside the Washington, D.C. area. (\$150.00; selected documents \$3.50)

Also available is a 22-pp. subject index to the Resistance Merrimac documents describing the date, number of pages, groups mentioned and tactics described in each of 456 documents. (\$2.50 copy)

C-16. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF ACADEMICS; 1970 and 1973; 8 pages. Tom Huston's 1970 memo informing DCI Helms that restrictions on domestic use of several intelligence gathering techniques had been lifted; and guidelines reprinted in 1973 prohibiting the Agency from covert funding of U.S. Educational or private voluntary organizations. (\$80/copy)

C-19. FILES ON CHE GUEVARA; 1958-1976; 184 pages. A request to the CIA for all files on Che Guevara and others produced responses from the State Dept., FBI, DIA, and Navy. The file includes accounts of Che's alleged activities in Cuba, Latin America, Africa and Vietnam; numerous false reports of his death; and several accounts of his capture and execution in Bolivia in 1967. (\$18.40/copy)

C-21. TWO MEMORANDA FROM CIA GENERAL COUNSEL TO CIA DIRECTOR; up to January 1962 - April 1962; 8 pages. The three memoranda from CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston to the Director discuss the legality of subversion and sabotage, and paramilitary cold-war activities. These memoranda argue that covert operations are legal despite the lack of congressional authorization in the 1947 NSC Act. (\$0.80/copy)

C-22. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATES RELATING TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; October 19 and 20, 1962; 30 pages. These papers concern the problem of assessing the strategic and political implications of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. They provide a history of the military buildup, discuss its implications, and note that the possibilities exist for an expansion of the buildup. The reports conclude that the Soviet objective is to prove that the U.S. can no longer prevent a Soviet presence in the hemisphere, and discusses the probable effect of a warning. (\$3.00/copy).

C-24. CIA RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA; 1958-1977; 914 pages. Nathan Gardels received these files through requests and litigation under the FOIA. They document CIA relationships and contracts with UC for research in political science, Chinese and Slavic studies, physics, and other fields; CIA use of academic cover; and covert recruiting.

C-25. CIA RELATIONSHIPS WITH**DOMESTIC FIRMS; 1975-1976; 67 pages.**

These documents, released in *Halperin v. CIA*, provide a limited look at the Agency's relationships with the Arnold & Porter law firm, hired to represent it during the 1975-1976 Senate investigation, and with Robert R. Mullen and Co. The CIA used Mullen Co., a public relations firm which hired E. Howard Hunt in 1970, for cover and other purposes. (\$6.70/copy)

C-26. OSWALD AND THE CUBAN

CONNECTION; April and May, 1975; 27 pages. This report represents a review of items in the CIA's Lee Harvey Oswald File "regarding allegations of Castro Cuban involvement in the John F. Kennedy assassination." The analysis was requested by the Rockefeller Commission. The report seeks, in part, to explain Oswald's "feelings toward and relations with Castro's Cuba." (\$2.70/copy)

C-27. CIA DRUG EXPERIMENTS; up to July

25, 1975; 146 pages. A collection of 59 documents detailing various CIA projects relating to drug and behavioral experiments. The file includes some documents from the Frank Olson case (see C-35), as well as documents describing MKULTRA, the CIA's top-secret project to investigate "the manipulation of human behavior." The research is said to be "considered by many in medicine and related fields to be professionally unethical. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy." (\$14.60/copy) [The entire 40,000-page release of CIA behavior control documents is available by appointment for inspection at the CNSS Library.]

C-28. MEMO FROM INSPECTOR GENERAL TO DIRECTOR OF CIA INVESTIGATING THE CIA'S NEW YORK MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAM; June 4, 1976; 11 pages. Colby's affidavit in an FOIA case—stating that all mail covers operated by the CIA's New York Intercept Program (HTLINGUAL) on US-USSR mail were indexed—sparked an investigation on the entire project by the Inspector General. The report examines the history of the project, its mail interception procedures, and analyzes how many and what kind of letters were photographed, opened, and indexed. (\$1.10/copy)

C-29. CIA ACTIVITIES IN LAOS: MEMO

FROM CIA GENERAL COUNSEL TO DIRECTOR; October 30, 1969; 2 pages. The memo resulted from Senator Fulbright's assertion that the CIA is "waging war" in Laos. The General Counsel proceeded to inform the Director of CIA operations in Laos (which he characterized as assisting the native population to prevent a military takeover) and of the Agency's authority to carry out such operations. (\$.20/copy)

C-30. PROJECT MUDHEN—GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS OF JACK ANDERSON; 1972; 39 pages. This file includes a copy of the complaint Anderson filed against Nixon, Kissinger, Helms and several others. Also included is a paper, "Chronology of a Conspiracy," which summarizes the government's investigation of Anderson, and a series of five memos detailing certain aspects of Project MUDHEN including operations, logs, and photos. (\$3.90/copy)

C-32. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES; 1946-1976; 285 pages. The directives are procedural memos from DCIs over a period of twenty years. They cover intelligence-related issues, including procedures for the Intelligence Advisory Committee, control of dissemination of foreign intelligence, security policy guidelines on liaison relationships with foreign intelligence organizations, recognition of exceptional service to the Agency, and exploitation of foreign language publications. Also included are directives relating to coordination of overt collection abroad, domestic exploitation of non-governmental organizations, and production of atomic energy intelligence. (\$28.50/copy)

C-33. CIA DOCUMENTS ON THE

DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA; April 1969 - August 1975; 230 pages. The disappearance in April 1969 of Dr. Thomas Riha, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Czechoslovakia who was a professor of Russian history at the University of Colorado, caused considerable publicity, and prompted a CIA investigation. The documents concern the unexplained disappearance and the subsequent involvement of University of Colorado President Joseph Smiley, local news reporters, and the CIA in investigations of the matter. Correspondence from William Colby to the Senate Intelligence Committee explains the limited role of the CIA in an affair that "was a domestic concern and beyond the jurisdiction and responsibility" of the Agency. News coverage concerning the disappearance is included. (\$23.00/copy)

C-34. CIA DOSSIER ON PETER CAMEJO AND OPERATION CHAOS FILES ON THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY; 1968-

1974; 220 pages. These files include an incomplete CIA dossier on Peter Camejo, the presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers Party. The Agency released 47 of the 108 extant documents on Camejo, which describe his political activities. Also included are Operation CHAOS files that add new details to the description provided by the Rockefeller and Church Reports on domestic spying by the CIA. The documents reveal the Agency's use of agents provocateurs and the widespread monitoring of SWP leaders. (\$22.00/copy)

C-35. THE DEATH OF FRANK OLSON;

January 11, 1976; 174 pages. These are the documents provided by the CIA to the family of Dr. Frank Olson, the government biochemist who died in November 1953 when he jumped from a tenth story window after taking LSD. The documents trace the CIA's investigation of the Olson death as well as its involvement over the years with drug experimentation. Some of these documents are also included in C-27. (\$17.40/copy)

C-36. CIA MAIL OPENINGS; 1971-1973; 238

pages. The documents include two meetings conducted by CIA Director Helms on HTLINGUAL, the Agency's mail opening project, as well as a 1973 statement by Director Colby concerning termination of the project. The Helms memoranda explain the Agency's collaboration with the Postal Service and the FBI; participants in the meeting decided to continue the program despite reservations over possible adverse publicity and embarrassment should the mail opening scheme surface. The "memorandum for the record" signed by Colby expresses his desire to transfer the operation to the FBI and directs that "the project be suspended until appropriate resolution of the problems involved." (\$23.80/copy)

C-37. CIA JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AGREEMENT REGARDING INVESTIGATION OF POSSIBLE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ARISING OUT OF CIA ACTIVITIES; 1954-1975; 19 pages. The memorandum from CIA General Counsel J.R. Houston to the Director of Central Intelligence explains the "balancing of interest between the duty to enforce the law . . . and the Director's responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods." Included is a brief summary of twenty cases in which violations of criminal statutes were reported to the Department of Justice between 1954 and 1975. A detailed examination of circumstances involved in the drug prosecution of Mr. Puttapon Khrampkhruan, former CIA employee, is also included. (\$1.90/copy)

C-39. CIA CONTRACTS WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-SAN DIEGO; 1966-1976; 121 pages. Copies of a negotiated contract between the CIA and U. of Cal. San Diego, describing completion dates, scope of work, location where research will be conducted, deliverable items and costs. The CIA contracts were for research in the field of image processing, a review of Soviet Geochemical Literature, and a study of agriculture in Communist China. (\$12.10/copy)

C-40. THE CIA AND LOCAL POLICE; 1967-1973; 177 pages. A series of memos and letters concerning direct CIA assistance to 12 municipal and/or county police departments including those of New York, Los Angeles, Boston, and Washington. The documents trace the history of CIA training seminars in photo and audio surveillance, narcotics, and "radical terrorist" control. (\$17.70/copy)

C-41. CIA CRITIQUE OF BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT; October 29, 1975; 39 pages. In response to a pamphlet, "The Central Intelligence Agency: Oversight and Accountability," prepared by a Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the CIA issued "a careful critique of the report, . . . together with a short summary." As the Agency explained, "This paper is not a brief in opposition; it is designed to question the validity of some of the research and thus raise legitimate questions as to some of the statements and conclusions." It includes sections on factual errors and misconceptions, misquotations, and material taken out of context. (\$3.90/copy)

C-42. SECRET LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIA; 1947-1948; 143 pages. These documents reveal the secret congressional testimony of the first two Directors of Central Intelligence, Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg and Rear Admiral R.H. Hillenkoetter. Director Hillenkoetter's April 1948 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee describes the problems which the fledgling intelligence agency faced in its first two years. The Vandenberg testimony was presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 1947 in support of the National Security Act of 1947 which provided for unification of the armed services and establishment of the CIA. (\$14.30/copy)

***C-44. CIA/RESISTANCE/BLACK STUDENT UNIONS; 1968-1971; 33 pages.** This file was released to researcher Murv Glass following a request for CIA files on the Black Student Union at the University of California at Santa Barbara. The documents show that Project Resistance and other CIA programs regularly used informants. [The Church Report stated that Resistance did not run unilateral informant operations.—Ed.] (\$3.30)

***C-45. CIA FILE ON UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AND CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES; 1965-1976; 279 pages.** This file was requested under FOIA by the editors of *Michigan Daily*. It documents confidential contacts between various CIA research offices and China scholars at the University of Michigan. It also shows the Agency's attempt to maintain academic contacts in a period when the propriety of classified government research was increasingly called into question. A 1966 CIA memo in the file states: "If a university wishes to stipulate provisos or qualifications we will be glad to consider them. The university need only say what they are." (\$27.90/copy)

***C-46. CIA/RESISTANCE/PEACE AND FREEDOM PARTY; 1968-1974; 85 pages.** This file was obtained by the Peace and Freedom Party under FOIA. The Party was an object of CIA domestic surveillance under Project Resistance. This file shows that more than 50,000 names of PFP members from a single state (California) were indexed by Resistance; the figure given by the Church Committee was 12-16,000 names nationwide. These indexes were retained at least as late as May 1974. (\$8.50/copy)

***C-47. CIA/POLICY ON RELATIONSHIPS WITH JOURNALISTS/MATERIAL SENT TO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES; 1973-1976; 47 pages.** After litigation under FOIA, these documents were released to journalist Judith Miller in response to a request for all material on CIA use of journalists which had been sent to the House and Senate Intelligence

Committees and the Rockefeller Commission. The file contains little factual information, but does include statements of CIA policy. Certain comments in the file raise the possibility that CIA contacts with journalists were more extensive than reported to the Committees. (\$4.70/copy)

C-48. CIA/IRS RECORDS ON RAMPARTS MAGAZINE/SPECIAL SERVICE STAFF; 1964, 1967, 1972; 12 pages. When *Ramparts* disclosed in 1967 that the CIA was funding the National Student Association, the CIA initiated an investigation of the tax status of the magazine. Also in the file are statements of the mission of the Special Service Staff, an IRS office which collected information on taxpayers based on political criteria. (\$1.20/copy)

C-49. CIA/WHITE HOUSE/DESTRUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND TOXINS; 1967-1970; 49 pages. In 1969 and 1970, President Nixon ordered the destruction of existing stockpiles of biological and toxic weapons. This file includes White House press releases, CIA documents listing the contents of the Agency's biological arsenal accumulated under MKNAOMI, and the text of international agreements prohibiting the development, production and use of such weapons. (\$4.90/copy)

C-54. CORRESPONDENCE OF VICTOR REUTHER INTERCEPTED BY THE CIA; 1968; 11 pages. Five items of Victor Reuther's correspondence intercepted in 1968. At that time an official of the United Auto Workers (UAW), Reuther's name was also on HTLINGUAL's "watch list" for mail intercepts from 1969-1971. (\$1.10/copy)

C-55. CIA DISTRIBUTIONS TO ACADEMICS; 1976; 11 pages. Lists of more than 40 colleges and universities to which the CIA sent unclassified publications produced by its overt research branch on Soviet government personnel, international terrorism, and other subjects. (\$1.10/copy)

C-58. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN 1976; July 1977; 22 pages. An analysis of trends in international terrorism which finds, among other things, that while the number of terrorist incidents increased in 1976, the number of acts involving kidnaping and hostages, and the proportion of acts directed against US citizens and property, declined. Cuban exile formations emerged as "among the most active and most disruptive terrorist groups." (\$2.20/copy)

C-61. DCI TURNER'S STATEMENT ON HARVARD GUIDELINES; August 1977; 3 pages. Turner states that the CIA will ignore Harvard's requirement that university officials be informed of all CIA contacts with university personnel, and dodges the issue of covert recruitment on campus. (\$3.00/copy)

C-63. STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE; 1972-1975; 297 pages. Seventeen previously classified articles and 33 book reviews written for circulation within the Intelligence Community. Subjects range from a post-mortem of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, to the use of logic in intelligence analysis, to a review of Agee's *Inside the Company*.

C-64. CIA ASSASSINATION PLOTS: MEMOS ON TRUJILLO, CASTRO, SOUTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS, BELGIAN CONGO LEADERS, MESSAGES CONCERNING TRUJILLO; 1960-1970, 198 pages. CIA discussions and planning of assassination plots concerning Trujillo, Castro, and S. Vietnamese and Belgian Congo leaders. CIA agents discuss eventual outcomes of such assassinations, and what effect the assassinations would have in those country. These documents were released pursuant to FOIA litigation. (\$19.80/copy.)

C-65. CIA USE OF ACADEMICS; 1967-1975; 148 pages. Released through litigation under the FOIA, these documents contain information on open and covert CIA-university relationships for purposes of research, recruitment, and surveillance of student dissent. (\$14.80/copy)

C-66. GLOMAR EXPLORER STORY; January 1974 - March 1975; 221 pages. Agency documents showing DCI Colby's vigorous efforts to keep the *Glomar Explorer* story out of the papers by briefing reporters and editors on its importance to the national security. The story was held for more than a year through the cooperation of the *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Washington Post*, *Parade Magazine*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, CBS, AP, UP, and other news organizations. The file contains the incidental statement by Colby that the Agency uses prostitutes to obtain information. (\$22.10/copy)

C-89. CIA OPERATION CHAOS; 1962-1977; 125 pages. Obtained through discovery in *Halkin v. Helms*, these documents from Operation Chaos and the Rockefeller Commission show that the extent and variety of domestic aspects of Chaos, as well as resistance to the project within the CIA, were greater than revealed by the Church Committee. They also contain evidence of CIA domestic spying as early as 1962, and of a cover-up of the operation from OMB auditors. They also discuss the preservation of information gathered by CHAOS and other issues. (\$12.50 copy)

† These documents form the appendix to a published CNSS Report on Operation CHAOS. The report is available for \$2.50.

C-70. CIA/CORRESPONDENCE WITH UNIVERSITIES ON GUIDELINES FOR CIA-ACADEMIC RELATIONSHIPS; 1976-1978; 97 pages. This file was released by the CIA after CNSS brought suit to obtain responses to 12 FOIA requests and consists for the most part of already-public

information. The file contains correspondence between the CIA and officials of Harvard and Amherst Universities and the University of Pennsylvania. The university officials argue that covert recruitment by and operational use of academics are inconsistent with the proper functions of a university; the CIA officials argue that these activities are necessary and should be allowed if individual academics choose to engage in them. The CIA officials also say that no full time university staff or faculty are used on an unwitting basis and that none are coerced into working with the Agency. The file contains copies of CIA regulations on relations with the U.S. academic community as well as its far stricter policy statements on relations with U.S. media and religious organizations. (\$9.70/copy)

C-71. DELETIONS FROM *THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE*; 1977-1980; 23 pages. Twenty-five of the 168 deletions withheld by the CIA from this 1974 book have recently been made public under the FOIA. This 23-page package contains the release as reinserted into the text of the hard cover edition as well as references to the paperback and manuscript page numbers. These now-released deletions deal with CIA activities in Cuba and Chile, CIA proprietaries, CIA-university ties, U.S. Africa policy, and other subjects. (\$2.30/copy)

C-75. CIA/MEETINGS BETWEEN CIA OFFICIALS AND UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS; April 1978-July 1978; 40 pages. This file was released in a suit brought by CNSS to obtain responses to 12 FOIA requests. The file contains correspondence and internal memoranda concerning a June 14, 1978 meeting between Admiral Turner and four university presidents which was intended to improve CIA-academic relations. The file also mentions a similar meeting with three university presidents on March 10, 1978. All participants agreed to accept the briefings under conditions of secrecy. (\$4.00/copy)

C-91. CIA/TESTIMONY ON EMPLOYEE SECRECY CONTRACT. March 6, 1980. 69 pages. Transcript of testimony of CIA officials before the House Intelligence Committee which explains the CIA's review procedures and the Agency's interpretation of the *Snapp* Supreme Court decision upholding the secrecy contract, why only CIA critics have been punished for breach of contract, how present CIA employees are held to extra restrictions, why books and articles but not columns, speeches and lectures are reviewed, and other points. (\$6.90/copy)

C-95. CIA/RESISTANCE/WILLIAM AND MARY; November 1969-June 1977; 40 pages. These documents, released to the William and Mary student newspaper *Flat Hat* under the FOIA, include three detailed informant reports on political activity at the campus. The reports were prepared for Project RESISTANCE, which according to the Church Committee did not use informants. The file also contains correspondence between the CIA and college administrators concerning overt recruiting. (\$4.00/copy)

C-96 "THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION"; June 1968; 57 pages. A Clandestine Services History of the planning, execution and eventual compromise of a 500-yard tunnel from West to East Berlin built by the CIA in order to tap major Soviet and East German phone lines. Although "from the beginning it was realized that the duration of this operation was finite," the project was considered one of the significant intelligence successes of the Cold War. The study was obtained under the FOIA by David Martin, author of *Wilderness of Mirrors*. (\$5.70/copy)

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